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Abstract 
Aims: This 11-month study analysed illicit drug sales on the anonymous Tor network, with a focus on 
investigating whether a seller’s reputation and capacity increased daily drug sales. Design and setting: 
The data was gathered from Silkkitie, the Finnish version of the Silk Road, by web crawling the site on a 
daily basis from November 2014 to September 2015). The data includes information on sellers (n=260) 
and products (n=3823). Measurements: The measurements include the sellers’ reputation, the sale 
amounts (in euros), the number of available products and the types of drugs sold. The sellers’ capacity 
was measured using their full sales potential (in euros). Fixed-effects regression models were used to 
estimate the effects of sellers’ reputation and capacity; these models were adjusted for the types of drugs 
sold. Findings: Overall, illicit drug sales totalled over 2 million euros during the study, but many 
products were not sold at all, and sellers were active for only a short time on average (mean=62.8 days). 
Among the products sold, stimulants were most widely purchased, followed by cannabis, MDMA, and 
psychedelics. A seller’s reputation and capacity were both associated with drug sales. Conclusion: The 
Tor network has enabled a transformation in drug sales. Due to the network’s anonymity, the seller’s 
reputation and capacity both have an impact on sales. 
Key words: illicit drugs, cryptomarket, Internet, Tor network, anonymity, longitudinal, web crawling 
1. Introduction
Illicit online drug sales first attracted major media attention with the rise and fall of the Silk Road in 
2011–2013 (Barratt et al., 2014; Martin, 2014a; Martin, 2014b). The Federal Bureau of Investigation shut 
down the Silk Road in October 2013 and its successor, the Silk Road 2, in November 2014 (Dolliver, 
2015). The Silk Road 3 was launched almost immediately after but was overrun by other sites, such as 
Agora and Evolution, which adopted some features of the original Silk Road (Dolliver et al., 2016; Van 
Buskirk et al., 2016). The common feature of all of these websites is that they protect the anonymity of 
their users; they are hence referred to as “cryptomarkets” (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Bancroft and 
Reid, 2017; Demant et al., 2016; Martin, 2014b; Van Buskirk et al., 2016). This article focuses 
particularly on the Finnish online service called Silkkitie. 
Silkkitie operates using the Tor network to hide its real location, just as Agora and various Silk Road 
versions did. The Tor (which stands for The Onion Router) network and software are designed to defend 
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human rights (Dingledine, 2004). This network can be used for censorship circumvention, online 
anonymity and high-level online privacy. It is possible to host a website inside the Tor network (a so-
called onion service) and to hide the physical location of the site’s server. Tor provides anonymity by 
routing the user’s traffic through three separate relay servers so that it is difficult to reveal the user’s 
physical location or IP address. This means that Tor protects users by encryption to ensure privacy, 
authentication between clients and relays and signatures to ensure that all clients know the same set of 
relays. 
 
Tor is considered very secure and resilient against surveillance: The U.S. National Security Agency called 
Tor “the king of high-secure, low-latency Internet anonymity” (The Guardian, 2013) in its top-secret 
documentation, in which it discusses its futile attempts to spy on Tor users. Despite this, different police 
operations have targeted sites and have at least been partially successful in reducing the activity in 
cryptomarkets (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017). Also, the identity of the original Silk Road 
developer, Ross William Ulbrich, was discovered after the FBI followed his behaviour pattern and 
gathered cumulative critical information for long enough (FBI, 2014). 
 
The anonymity of online drug markets is guaranteed by digital currencies and payment systems that 
significantly increase the difficulty of tracking down buyers and sellers. Bitcoin is one digital currency 
and a payment system in one; it was invented by an unknown entity who calls himself Satoshi Nakamoto 
(Nakamoto, 2008; Bohannon, 2016; Kristoufek, 2015). Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer application that allows 
digital money transfers between users. Its monetary system is decentralised and designed to work without 
central banks, governments and regulations. Although Bitcoins are used in multiple legal ways, these 
anonymity properties also make Bitcoin attractive to criminals. 
 
The work on illicit cryptomarkets has expanded rapidly since 2015. Many of the studies have been based 
on the Silk Road (e.g., Alridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Barratt and Maddox, 2016) and their successors, 
such as the Silk Road 2.0, Agora, Alphabay and Valhalla (e.g., Van Buskirk et al., 2016; Décary-Hétu and 
Giommoni, 2017; Demant et al., 2016; Dolliver and Kuhns, 2016; Van Hout and Hearne, 2017). Studies 
have employed more traditional research methods such as surveys and interviews (Barratt et al., 2014; 
Van Hout & Bingham 2013a, b) and newer approaches employing web crawlers (Alridge and Décary-
Hétu, 2016; Demant et al., 2016; Dolliver, 2015; Dolliver et al., 2016; Aldridge, 2016; Christin, 2013; 
Hardy and Norgaard, 2015; Munksgaard et al., 2016). Some studies have also investigated the quality of 
drugs sold in the cryptomarkets (Caudeville et al., 2016; Rhumorbarbe al al., 2016). There is also 
currently a need to understand that cryptomarkets are also used very locally, as in our Finnish case. So far 
country cases have involved, for example, Canada (Broséus et al., 2016) and Switzerland (Rhumorbarbe 
et al., 2016), and some studies have involved cross-national comparison (Van Buskirk et al., 2016).  
 
Studies on the Silk Road indicate that users were typically males in their 20s and prioritised the Silk Road 
over street markets for quality reasons and for personal safety (Barratt et al., 2014; Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2013b; Barratt et al., 2016a, Barratt et al., 2016b). Cryptomarket users have been characterised 
as a “technological drug subculture” (Van Hout and Bingham, 2013b), which also represents a form of 
online activism underlining individual freedoms based on libertarian ethos (Maddox et al., 2016; 
Munksgaard and Demant, 2016). Users’ right to choose is combined with the expressed joy of having the 
opportunity to choose their preferred drugs like “kids in a candy store” (Barratt et al., 2016b). 
 
As cryptomarkets are organised to guarantee the full anonymity of the users, they also bring challenges 
for the users. Social psychologists have underlined that anonymous behaviour can be highly regulated on 
the Internet (Keipi and Oksanen, 2014; Spears et al., 2002). In cryptomarkets, anonymity is enforced by 
instability, which may even enforce the anonymity effects of online behaviour. Instability is one of the 
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central features of online drug markets, as most items are sold quickly and the majority of sellers 
disappear within a few months (Christin, 2013). Hence,  there is a need for building “reputation systems” 
(Resnick, 2000; Houser and Wooders, 2006) or “trust systems” (Lusthaus, 2012) on cryptomarkets. 
Public user feedback is one of the common parts of such reputation or trust systems. 
 
A previous study by Hardy and Norgaard (2015) showed that seller reputation had a positive impact on 
cannabis sales. They argue that users’ feedback is a central feature in cannabis sales on the Silk Road 
because sellers and buyers do not know each other. Positive reputation gives the impression that the seller 
is trustworthy, which leads to increased sales (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). It has also been found that 
vendors who had poor user ratings were more likely to take the risk of shipping drugs internationally 
(Décary-Hétu et al., 2016). Besides user feedback, it is often important to communicate well with the 
customer and create an impression of trustworthiness. According to Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 
successful online criminals have communicative skills that lead to higher rewards (Décary-Hétu and 
Leppänen, 2013). 
 
In the absence of visual cues that are typically available in an offline context, online buyers must rely on 
what information is available, which also separates online cryptomarkets from the traditional drug trade. 
We argue here, in addition to the seller’s reputation, that seller’s apacity is another potential factor of 
successful sales. Seller’s capacity refers to sellers’ promises regarding the variety and quantity of high-
quality products available. This is part of communication with the customers. Seller’s capacity or promise 
of a lot of drugs in stock will create positive expectations that will lead to higher sales. It is common for 
cybercriminals to construct an online identity and create trustworthiness to attract criminal partners 
(Lusthaus, 2012). Seller’s capacity is part of this communication, but it has not been previously studied 
with regard to cryptomarkets. However, economic studies on advance selling have shown that seller 
capacity is positively associated with consumer behaviour (Yu et al., 2015). 
 
In this study, our aim was to research both the seller’s reputation and capacity in Silkkitie. We will first 
provide descriptive results on the general drug sales on Silkkitie. The main focus of the article lies, 
however, on the reputation and capacity that represent different facets of the seller that are available to 
buyers. Anonymity directs users’ attention to the available features and typically also enforces group 
behaviour (Keipi and Oksanen, 2014; Spears et al., 2002). Hence, in cryptomarket, trust system is based 
on both direct feedback and successful communication (Hardy and Norgaard, 2015; Resnick, 2000; 
Houser and Wooders, 2006; Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013; Lusthaus, 2012). Our hypotheses were 
grounded on these premises, and we expected that a positive seller reputation would be positively 
associated with that entity’s daily sales. In addition, we expected that an increase in a seller’s capacity 
would increase that entity’s sales. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Silkkitie as a marketplace 
 
Silkkitie was opened in the Tor network on 6 January 2014, and it was originally intended to be used 
specifically for illicit drug sales in Finland. Because both the seller and the buyer are located within 
Finland, even detecting the drugs is difficult because there is no customs process for screening domestic 
shipments. For these reasons, virtually all of the Finnish sellers mention that the shipments are posted via 
domestic mail. As Silkkitie is the main online marketplace for Finnish drug buyers, it is a useful measure 
of the overall Finnish online drug market. In 2015, Silkkitie published the English translation of the site 
to attract user space outside Finland. The original Finnish version (http://silkkitiehdg5mug.onion/) now 
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has an English translation called Valhalla (http://valhallaxmn3fydu.onion/). Bitcoin currency and the 
Bitcoin wallet system are used for payment, and Silkkitie requires sellers to use PGP encryption (Pretty 
Good Privacy, see Zimmerman 1995) and offer their public keys to buyers for encrypted and safe text 
communication. Silkkitie shows prices in euros and Bitcoins using the latest exchange rate. We have 
collected transaction data in terms of euros. 
 
After Silkkitie users have created their user accounts on the service, they may select a role as a seller, 
which enables them to offer products on sale. The sellers may then set the price and describe both the 
product and the terms of the delivery. The seller’s reputation is a central feature on Silkkitie (see Figure 
1). Buyers can give feedback by rating the product and the transaction (good: + or bad: –). Buyers see this 
feedback, so sellers have to keep up their reputations. More importantly, Silkkitie offers escrow service 
by holding the Bitcoins used for purchase and returning them to buyers if there is a lot of negative 
feedback. This makes it very important for sellers to build good reputations. 
 
 
2.2. Web-crawling process 
 
We employed automatic web-crawling and web-scraping techniques to extract information from the 
Silkkitie site every day between 5 November 2014 and 23 September 2015. This method is similar to the 
one that was developed to study the Silk Road’s transactions (Christin, 2013). From a wider perspective, 
we are using the Open Source Intelligence methodology (Glassman and Kang, 2012). Our method is 
simple and very precise. Our web-scraping software extracted the product information from every product 
page on Silkkitie. The collected fields were title, price, number of items in stock, seller’s nickname, 
seller’s positive and negative feedback, seller’s country, buyer’s country and the product page’s unique 
URL.  
 
We executed the software once a day over a period of almost 11 months (322 days). Once a day is enough 
to study day-to-day drug trade. During our data collection period, 36 days are missing due to the Silkkitie 
server being offline. Half of these days took place in June and July 2015. During this period, Silkkitie 
users raised concern that the administrator of Silkkitie, who calls himself Kapteeni (“Captain” in 
English), had shut down Silkkitie and run off with the remaining Bitcoins. The service continued, 
however, after a short break.  
 
 
2.3. Measures 
 
For this study we only used sales that took place within Finland by removing items where the seller's 
location was abroad or seller was willing to sell abroad. The full data includes 93 878 observations, and 
the data covers 286 days of transactions from 260 sellers offering 3823 products. The data includes 
information on products’ prices, the amount in stock and additional details. Drug sales were calculated 
using the information on available stock. For analytic purposes, the data was organised into panel format 
and included 16 815 daily observations of sellers, including seller’s daily drug sales, reputation, capacity 
and the drugs that the seller had sold during the specific day. 
 
Seller’s daily drug sales are the total value of all the products sold in a single day. The median amount of 
daily sales was 0, but the mean daily sales were 129 euros/seller. The excess of zero-value days is caused 
by the fact that many sellers did not make sales on a daily basis. This value is used as an outcome variable 
in the regression models. 
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Silkkitie sellers have categorised their products as stimulants, cannabis, opiates, empathogens, 
psychedelics, opiates, dissociatives, depressants and other pharmaceuticals (see Table 1 for the specific 
information). We decided to use this categorisation, which seems to represent experiences that buyers try 
to gain from the drugs, instead of categorisations based on the chemical formations and legal status. 
 
A seller’s reputation quantifies the seller’s combined positive and negative feedback (reputation = 
positive comments – negative comments). The sellers’ reputations ranged from –19 to 3418. However, 
out of 16 815 observations, only 101 (0.6%) were under zero. Based on the 16 815 daily observations of 
sellers, the median capacity was 78 euros. The seller reputation figures for different types of drugs are 
provided in Table 2. 
 
A seller’s capacity is calculated for each day for each seller. It is based on the total value of the seller’s 
reported stock in euros in a single day (capacity= 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒&𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘&+&,- ), where n is the total number of 
producs that the seller is offering. In other words, the seller’s capacity is calculated on the basis of the 
daily product information of each seller. Based on the 16 815 daily observations of sellers, the median 
capacity was 1602 euros. Capacity figures for different types of drugs are provided in Table 2.  
 
 
2.4. Statistical analyses 
 
We first ran descriptive statistics using the full data with a total of 93 878 observations. We used Stata 
12.0 to run fixed-effects Poisson regression models to analyse the daily drug sales (in euros). These 
models accounted for both the sellers and the day when the data was gathered, ranging from 1 (5 
November 2014) to 268 (23 September 2015). 
 
Poisson regression was selected due to the skewed continuous outcome variable. Although there are 
several alternatives for treating such outcomes (including a linear regression with log-transformed 
outcomes), Poisson regression has been argued to provide the best alternative (Santos and Tenreyro, 
2006). We ran the models using Huber-White standard errors (i.e., robust standard errors) due to 
overdispersion (Palmer, 2007). Another option would have been using a fixed-effects negative binomial 
regression, but there is risk of incidental parameter bias that does not occur with Poisson regression 
models (Allison, 2012). 
 
The models first report the unadjusted effects of both reputation and availability. We used a square-root 
transformation for the seller’s reputation and a natural logarithmic transformation for the seller’s capacity 
to correct the skewness of these variables. The final models include drug categories as dummy variables 
(0=no sales in that category, 1=at least one sale in that category). Models were checked for 
multicollinearity; no problems were found in this respect, and sellers’ reputations and capacities are both 
clear and distinct predictors of their daily sales. The results section also reports the daily sales based on 
the percentiles of the seller’s reputation and capacity. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
The total value of the illegal drugs sold on Silkkitie during the 11 months of the study was 2 171 387 
euros, and 41 131 items were sold during this period (see Table 2). Stimulants were the most valuable 
class of drug (538 354 euros), followed by cannabis products (487 111 euros) and empathogens (mostly 
MDMA; 396 127 euros). Depressants were the least sold, with only 4975 euros of sales. Figure 2 shows 
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the sales values of different substances during the study. We can see that stimulants, cannabis and 
empathogens combine to make up over half of all sales during each month. 
 
Out of 3823 products listed, only 51% were sold. Psychedelics had the highest proportion of sold 
products (64%), and opiates had the lowest (38%). The mean price of the sold products was 84 euros, and 
the mean daily sales amount per seller was 129 euros, but the largest daily sale by a seller was 85 000 
euros. High figures in daily sales were, however, very unusual, as 5000 euros/day were exceeded only 10 
times, and by only 7 sellers out of a total of 260 sellers. Considering all the sales taking place during the 
follow-up period of the study, almost 15% of the sellers did not have sales at all, while the highest selling 
15% were responsible for 82% of the total sales in Silkkitie. 
 
We used fixed-effects regression models to analyse the associations between a seller’s daily sales and 
his/her reputation and capacity (Table 3). Model 0 reports the unadjusted effects on daily sales due to a 
seller’s reputation and capacity. The models were run separately for both reputation and capacity, which 
were both positively associated with sales. Model 1 includes both the seller’s reputation and capacity in 
the same model. Model 2 adds the daily sold substances as dummy variables. None of these dummy 
variables were statistically significant in the model at the level of p<0.05; hence, they were not included 
in Table 3. Model 2 included 222 sellers and 16 243 observations in total, for an average of 72.9 daily 
observations per seller. The model is statistically significant; both seller reputation and capacity were 
positively associated with daily sales. 
 
Figure 3 shows the changes in daily sales on Silkkitie based on the percentile values of the seller’s 
reputation and capacity (adjusted based on a fixed-effects regression model). The model includes the 
seller’s reputation and capacity as predictors; it is adjusted for the daily sales of different substances. We 
can see that the (lowest) 10th-percentile group in terms of reputation has daily sales of only 62 euros on 
average and that the (highest) 90th-percentile group has sales of 222 euros on average. A similar linear 
increase is seen for seller’s capacity. We can also see that the sales are especially high for the 80th and 
90th percentile in terms of reputation. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Our results showed that the illicit drug sales on Silkkitie were worth over 2 million euros during the 11-
month study. Our main goal in this study was to analyse the impact of the seller’s reputation and capacity 
on daily drug sales. Theoretically, the article was grounded on previous work done on trust systems 
(Resnick, 2000; Houser and Wooders, 2006; Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013; Lusthaus, 2012) and 
previous research showing that the seller’s reputation has a positive impact on sales in drug markets 
(Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). We also consider the seller’s daily capacity (i.e., the reported sales 
potential), which has been shown to have an interaction with consumer behaviour (Yu et al., 2015), but 
this effect has not previously been studied in a cryptomarket setting. 
 
Our Silkkitie findings provide further empirical evidence on the importance of trust systems on 
cryptomarkets. Higher reputations and capacities indicated higher daily sales. Reputation and capacity 
represent different facets of information available for the cryptomarket consumers, and they both can be 
considered an integral part of the trust system in the cryptomarket. The most successful sellers have both 
a high reputation and a high capacity. Specifically, the capacity figures are dependent on what the sellers 
have reported as the available stock and we consider them as part of communication with the buyers. It 
has been also indicated in previous studies that cybercriminals are expected to attract companions in 
crime through successful communication (Décary-Hétu and Leppänen, 2013). 
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It is possible that a seller’s reputation and capacity have become even more important due to the 
instability of cryptomarkets. Within our data, we could see that daily drug sales varied considerably 
during the study period, many products were not sold at all and that many sellers remained active for only 
a short period of time. Specifically, risk-averse online consumers might avoid such sellers. At least in our 
data, this was shown as a concentration of sales towards those sellers who had higher reputations and 
capacity. Results on reputation and capacity are, however, also valid for the smaller sellers and sales of a 
variety of drugs. 
 
Silkkitie also provides a very interesting national case that drug markets are changed by the 
cryptomarkets. Although stimulants, cannabis products and empathogens (e.g., MDMA) were among the 
most sold products during the study, a wide variety of substances were sold. This follows the general user 
pattern in Finland. The drug use problem in Finland is characterised by the absence of heroin and by the 
high prevalence of amphetamine and buprenorphine use (EMCDDA, 2016). Cannabis, amphetamines and 
MDMA are the most widely used illegal substances in Finland (Hakkarainen et al., 2015). Compared to 
other widely popular drugs, these substances are more associated with recreational use; opioids and 
depressants are more popular among marginalised drug users (Pitkänen et al., 2016). 
 
Based on the wastewater analyses, there is an estimate that the size of the Finnish drug market for 
stimulants (amphetamine, cocaine and methamphetamine) was around 80 million euros in 2014 
(Kankaanpää et al., 2016). The cannabis market can be estimated to be somewhere between 20 million 
and 100 million based on estimations of cannabis use (c.f. Hakkarainen et al., 2006), and there are 
markets for buprenorphine and benzodiazepines, used most frequently but not only by disadvantaged drug 
users (Tammi et al., 2011). Considering this, Silkkitie is a major marketplace in Finland. However, most 
of the drugs in Finland are sold through traditional routes. It is also possible that Silkkitie provides a 
forum for new types of drug users who would not necessarily buy their drugs from the normal offline 
markets (Barratt et al., 2016a, 2016b). 
 
According to the Finnish law enforcement, the largest vendor of Silkkitie, called Douppikauppa, was 
caught in April 2016 when a Finnish Customs unit intercepted a vehicle that was smuggling drugs 
between the Netherlands and Finland (Finnish Customs, 2016). The car contained several kilos of illegal 
drugs, including ecstasy tablets, LSD tabs, amphetamine and methamphetamine (Finnish Customs, 2016). 
This did not disrupt the drug sales on Silkkitie and Valhalla, however. Indeed, the Silkkitie case simply 
demonstrates again how difficult it is to control and prevent sales in cryptomarkets. Although law 
enforcement could successfully capture some of the key actors involved, the markets are quickly re-
established (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni, 2017). 
 
Despite the fact that we were able to collect data for almost 11 months, we would like to mention some 
limitations of our study. We performed data extraction once a day, but on some occasions, we failed to 
get this data because the Silkkitie server was offline. In addition, we might have missed some information 
if a seller removed a product from the marketplace between the measurements. Similarly, it is possible 
that an old product could be registered as new because the seller changed the product title. We believe, 
however, that these limitations are not critical for our main analyses, which concentrated on seller 
reputation and capacity. Furthermore, our data is extensive, so the missing data is unlikely to have an 
impact on the analyses. To our knowledge, our data set is one of the largest one that has been collected 
from the cryptomarkets. Furthermore, our data set is not vulnerable to the challenges concerning the 
collection of online data from other platforms, such as the Silk Road. In the Silk Road, for example, 
incomplete crawls may lead to misleading results (Munksgaard et al., 2016). 
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In this study, we were able to follow the extent of trading and produce almost real-time statistics about 
how people buy and sell illegal drugs. Our method is highly reliable, and the long period of data 
collection guarantees this reliability. Hence, this study contributes to the increasing body of literature 
studying cryptomarkets with web crawlers (e.g., Aldridge, 2016; Alridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; 
Christin, 2013; Demant et al., 2016; Hardy and Norgaard, 2015). Most important, our results help reveal 
the consumer interactions between sellers and buyers on online cryptomarkets, and our findings underline 
the relevance of both reputation and capacity as parts of the cryptomarket trust system. Future studies 
should continue to collect longitudinal data sets. 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1: Drug categories in Silkkitie 
 
Drug category in Silkkitie Drugs included 
Stimulants 
Amphetamine, cocaine, metamphetamine, 
A-PVP, cathinones, crack, MDPV, 2-
FMA/4-FA, 4-MePPP, phenidates, nicotine, 
coffeine, snuff 
Cannabis 
Weed, hash, edibles, concentrates, leaf, 
synthetics 
Emphatogens Ecstasy, MDMA, MDA/MDAI, methylone 
Psychedelics 
LSD, DMT/AMT, mushrooms, 25x-
NBOMe, ayahuasca, mescaline, 2C-x, 2C-
T-x, 5-MeO-DiPT, 5-MeO-MiPT, bromo-
dragonfly, LSA/LSZ, AL-LAD, Ibogaine, 
Dox 
Other pharmaceutics 
Benzodiazepines, erectile dysfunction 
drugs, sleeping pills, ADHD medication, 
pain, sedatives, muscle relaxants, MAOIs, 
nootropics  
Opiates 
Heroin, buprenorphine, oxycodone, 
fentanyl, tramadol, codeine, morphine, 
opium, metadon 
Dissociatives Ketamine, salvia, MXE/MXP, datura 
Depressants GHB/GBL, alcohol 
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Table 2: Descriptive information about sales on Silkkitie during the 11-month study period 
 
	 Total sales (€) Items sold 
Different 
products 
on sale 
% of 
sold 
products 
Median 
product 
price 
Median 
price of 
products 
sold 
Median 
seller 
reputation  
Median 
seller 
reputation 
(during the 
day the sale 
took place) 
Median 
seller 
capacity 
per 
product 
Stimulants 538 354 7 242 529 52 80 48 153 203 1 165 
Cannabis 487 111 8 878 807 62 70 55 116 131 648 
Emphatogens 396 127 8 424 236 53 99 70 368 476 3 645 
Psychedelics 336 010 5 826 261 64 50 40 537 617 900 
Other 
pharmaceuticals 180 728 6 244 1 113 50 32 23 63 67 140 
Opiates 181 316 3 734 804 38 70 43 368 476 388 
Dissociatives 46 766 632 38 47 70 68 1732 1778 1 878 
Depressants 4 975 151 35 49 85 60 156 539 630 
Total 2 171 387 41 131 3 823 51 55 39 120 139 488 
 
Note: figures are based on 93 878 observations. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Reputation and availability explaining daily sales on Silkkitie (based on fixed-effects Poisson 
regression models) 
 
	 Reputation    Capacity    
Model Coeff. 
Robust 
SE Z P Coeff. 
Robust 
SE Z P 
0 0.029 0.012 2.51 0.012 0.209 0.047 4.49 <0.001 
1 0.024 0.011 2.27 0.023 0.199 0.043 4.65 <0.001 
2 0.025 0.010 2.52 0.012 0.120 0.055 2.18 0.029 
 
Note: Model 0 shows unadjusted effects for both reputation and capacity separately. Model 1 includes reputation 
and capacity in the same model, and Model 2 adds the daily sold substances as controls. The final model 2 included 
222 sellers and 16 243 observations (observations per seller: minimum 2, maximum 267, mean 72.9) 
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Figure 1: Example screenshot from Silkkitie, with the seller’s positive and negative feedback in 
parentheses following the seller’s name 
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Figure 2: Sales of different substances on Silkkitie between 5 November 2014 and 26 September 
2015 
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 Figure 3: Change in daily sales on Silkkitie based on percentile values of reputation and 
availability (adjusted predictions based on fixed-effects regression models) 
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